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Advocacy for the protection of animal welfare and women’s right to 
reproductive choice have little, if anything, in common. It is productive, then, 
to question the recurring association of these unrelated ethical issues. If one 
feels compassion for the plight of the nonhuman animal, the argument goes, 
then it is morally inconsistent to neglect the fetus. An understanding of the 
incongruous political contexts at play between abortion and animal welfare 
effectively repudiates this argument, but a more important question must be 
answered: why is this strange argument so pervasive? In brief, it is the uniform 
legal marginalization of women and animals that animates this false 
comparison, which is instructively analyzed through the theoretical lens of 
ecofeminism. The leading Canadian judgments of R v Morgentaler and R v 
Ménard exemplify the socio-legal contours of ‘otherness’ outside the locus of 
patriarchal dominance. This renders a broadly transferable framework of 
oppression at the hands of the law; examining jurisprudential examples of 
displacement of agency, fragmentation of the self, and instrumental 
objectification, in both contexts, provides a useful starting point in a 
consideration of the broad intersections between the legal treatment of women 
and animals.   
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The issues of abortion and the exploitation of nonhuman animals have little 
in common, but share a pronounced ability to provoke heated, partisan debate. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it follows that the two are often linked. Critics who 
oppose a woman’s right to reproductive choice view the animal welfare stance as 
a useful tool; if one cares about animal subjects, the argument goes, then perhaps 
this moral consideration extends to the fetus. While this literature ignores 
important differences and seeks to erode female bodily autonomy, it also 
instructively demonstrates the law’s culpability in treating disadvantaged groups 
in a way that masks their distinct identities. A nuanced analysis of the law 
surrounding women’s reproductive freedom and animal welfare reveals the 
dominant patriarchal perspective from which the law proceeds. As a necessary 
extension, this discussion puts the other—those outside the privileged 
perspective—into stark relief.   
The notion that both women and nonhuman animals reside in this periphery 
is intuitive given the patriarchal character of our social and legal fabric; however, 
a careful consideration of the values embodied in these controversial areas of 
jurisprudence should take nothing for granted. While the law aims to homogenize 
these groups, it is essential to both foreground their differences and understand 
the legal workings of uniform ‘otherness.’ Although arguments that link the issues 
of abortion and animal welfare are generally unpersuasive, they are particularly 
instructive regarding the patriarchal oppressive impulse.   
Simply put, the body of criticism advocating for moral consistency—that is, 
parallel ethical concern for both fetuses and nonhuman animals—is unconcerned 
with the animal welfare movement. Instead, pro-animal arguments are 
misappropriated and misapplied in an effort to disguise the central role of the 
pregnant woman in the abortion debate. Approaching the issue through the 
critical lens of ecofeminism elucidates the mutually informing nature of 
patriarchal domination directed at women and nonhuman animals. This 
theoretical framework speaks from the margins of the legal system and 
underscores instances where subjugation intersects; it is therefore a particularly 
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useful tool for understanding the jurisprudential implications of likening 
antiabortion and pro-animal stances.   
The legal treatment of these two unrelated issues has a particular culpability 
in the recurrence of these arguments because the law marginalizes both women 
and nonhuman animals in the same ways. Accordingly, a brief consideration of 
the background of each issue and a discussion of representative scholarship on 
both sides is an important starting point of this legal complicity.   
First, I summarize the relevant animal rights philosophies and consider these 
arguments in the context of antiabortion rhetoric; a careful consideration of the 
tenuous analogies advanced and the dissimilar thresholds of moral subjecthood 
dispels the initial seductiveness of these arguments. Secondly, I bring into relief 
the ongoing critical debate, drawing particularly on the work of Gary Francione 
to refute sentience-based arguments and emphasize the unique political context 
of pregnancy and abortion. Thirdly, I employ the ecofeminist lens to foreground 
the patriarchal subjugating impulse at play in both contexts. Finally, in light of 
this backdrop, the leading cases of R v Morgentaler1 and R v Ménard2 exemplify 
these parallel tropes of domination; I unpack these arguments using theories of 
intersectional oppression. Ultimately, the forced conflation of the two issues can 
be traced to the law’s uniform oppressive impulse, which fragments, objectifies, 
and withholds agency in broadly similar ways.3   
In order to understand the arguments supporting the conflation of 
antiabortion and animal welfare positions, it is useful to outline the primary moral 
theories at play. While this is a broad, diverse field of inquiry—and one that, 
generally speaking, exceeds the scope of this paper—Peter Singer and Tom Regan 
                                                                                                                                         
1 R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385 [Morgentaler]. 
2 R v Ménard, [1978] JQ No 187, 4 CR (3d) 333 [Ménard]. 
3 For the sake of simplicity, in this paper I sometimes use the term “animal” to refer to nonhuman animals. 
Likewise, while it is technically reserved for the second trimester and onward, I use the term “fetus” to 
describe an unborn human at any stage of development. 
110 ANIMAL WELFARE DISCOURSE & THE ANTI-CHOICE MOVEMENT Vol. 25 
 
are frequently invoked in these debates and therefore provide a useful starting 
point for this discussion.  
In his famous text, Animal Liberation, Singer makes a significant observation: 
“Equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact.”4 Although this point may seem 
intuitive, it has important implications for animal rights discourse. Instead of 
looking to a being’s capacity to exercise familiar rights—for instance, the right to 
vote or the right to free speech—this approach emphasizes a question first 
articulated by Jeremy Bentham: “Can they suffer?”5 Singer identifies the ability to 
enjoy and suffer as prerequisites for having interests that should be morally 
recognized.6 He argues that, short of speciesism, needless pain inflicted on a baby 
or an animal is equally immoral.7 By advocating for a low threshold of 
subjecthood, Singer proposes a broad scope of ethical consideration, which those 
looking to privilege fetal rights over those of the pregnant woman have 
exploited.8 At this level of generality, this argument appears conducive to an 
antiabortion sentiment; however, as discussed below, Singer’s philosophy 
contains important qualifications that effectively remove it from this context. 
  The other major perspective that forms the background of this inquiry is 
Regan’s notion of ‘subjects-of-a-life.’ Regan’s theory accords this status to those 
with the capacity to experience pleasure and pain and form preferences; they must 
have a sense of the future, both generally and in the context of desire, and be 
capable of remembering their past and forming a psychophysical identity.9 The 
significance of this idea for animal welfare proponents is concisely stated by Julian 
Franklin in Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy.10 He suggests that Regan’s ‘harm 
                                                                                                                                         
4 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, revised ed (New York: HarperCollins, 2009) at 4 [Singer]. 
5 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner Publication 
Company, 1948) at 311. 
6 Singer, supra note 4 at 4. 
7 Speciesism is the idea that humans, by virtue only of our species, are entitled to greater moral rights than 
nonhuman animals. 
8 Singer, supra note 4 at 15. 
9 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Oakland: University of California Press, 1983) at 243. 
10 Julian H Franklin, Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
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principle’ is based on the idea that inflicting pain without a justifiable reason is 
immoral. Franklin then goes on to observe the extension of the harm principle 
to nonhuman animals; Regan demonstrates the capacity of developed mammals 
to suffer and argues that it must, then, be wrong to inflict needless suffering on 
them.11 Ultimately, Regan advocates for the inherent worth of each individual, 
since “it has a life that is ‘its own.’”12 While this may appear conducive to a pro-
fetal life stance, subjects-of-a-life are nevertheless defined by certain important 
criteria they possess, not by mere ontology. Given these clear distinctions, it is 
worth pausing to consider the prevalence of this comparison.  
The preponderance of arguments linking animal rights and antiabortion 
stances is not coincidental. At varying degrees of distortion, both Singer’s 
utilitarianism and Regan’s ‘subjects-of-a-life’ doctrine suggest far-reaching ethical 
concern for vulnerable individuals. Given that these ideas are at the forefront of 
animal defense scholarship, it is unsurprising that their potential implications for 
the issue of abortion have been discussed.   
Notably, and often omitted by those who employ his ethics to argue against 
reproductive choice, Singer explicitly discusses the implications of his work in the 
context of the abortion debate. His conclusion is in fundamental opposition to 
the arguments conflating antiabortion and pro-animal positions. He writes: “the 
life of a fetus (and even more plainly, of an embryo) is of no greater value than 
the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality, self-consciousness, 
awareness, capacity to feel, etc., and since no fetus is a person no fetus has the 
same claim to life as a person.”13 Signer does not advocate for the extension of 
animal welfare compassion to the fetus; rather, he holds that the moral culpability 
of terminating a pregnancy relates directly to the fetal capacity to suffer and 
enjoy—that is, to have interests.   
                                                                                                                                         
11 Ibid at 15-16. 
12 Ibid at 17. 
13 Ibid at 15-16. 
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Grace Kao best summarizes the problem; she states that “[a]nimal pain is 
arguably comparable to fetal pain in that we can only reason about either by 
analogy.”14 This process gives rise to a line-drawing exercise between sentient and 
nonsentient beings, which has led some to conclude that the “fate of fetuses and 
animals must either stand or fall together.”15 Champions of this position argue 
that “[a]t the level of substantive moral argument, both pro-life and animal rights 
positions are characterized by their appeal to a priori, absolutist categories as 
constituting the necessary limit to our power over others.”16 While this 
perspective effectively ignores the fact that ‘absolutist categories’ can—and, in 
this case, do—have different threshold content, it serves as a reminder that pro-
animal arguments are easily appropriated and reductively applied by those wishing 
to promote fetal rights. The distinction between abortion and animal welfare 
must, then, rest on something more than a utilitarian analysis of a fetus or a 
nonhuman animal.  
Despite these dissimilarities, critics who conflate animal defense and 
antiabortion positions frame the comparison around the assistance of the 
dependent and the vulnerable.17 This claim, however, is not universally accepted; 
many scholars reject the ‘homological’ view—one that purports to identify 
parallels between pro-fetal life and animal rights theories—and Gary Francione 
is its most explicit opponent. In spite of his work dismantling this position, 
antiabortionists continue to draw connections between these false friends. As 
recently as 2015, Cheryl Abbate published an article intended to directly rebut 
Francione’s piece from 20 years earlier.18 Still, her critique fails to engage with the 
substance of Francione’s arguments and seems to misunderstand his key points.   
                                                                                                                                         
14 Grace Kao, “Consistency in Ecofeminist Ethics” (2006) 3:11 Intl J Humanities 11 at 13 [Kao]. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, “The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology and Abortion” (1991) 25:4 
Ga LRev 923 at 944 [Mensch & Freeman]. 
17 Cheryl E Abbate, “Adventures in Moral Consistency: How to Develop an Abortion Ethic through an 
Animal Rights Framework” (2015) 18 Ethic Theory Moral Prac 145 at 146 [Abbate]. 
18 Ibid.  
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Are abortion and animal rights really comparable issues? Francione, an 
American legal scholar, addressed this question in 1995.19 In response to 
contemporaneous debate in moral philosophy, his essay in Animals & Women was 
an effort to untangle these two “terribly complicated” legal and social issues. 
Francione directed his article as much to the pro-choice feminists who felt 
betrayed by animal rights discourse as to the antiabortionists making the ‘moral 
consistency’ argument that provoked this entanglement.20 Refuting the idea that 
support for animal rights is “one step down the road toward recognition of fetal 
rights,”21 Francione engages with the question of sentience, but his analysis does 
not begin and end there; for him, determining the proper moral outcome requires 
an appreciation of the distinct political contexts at play.22   
 
A focus on sentience alone, according to Francione, can lead to the 
erroneous conclusion that approval of Singer’s views mandates the inclusion of 
human fetuses in the utilitarian calculus.23 Antiabortion rhetoric presents 
sentience as an all-or-nothing proposition; accordingly, the interests of the 
nominally sentient fetus would require ethical consideration. Proponents of the 
moral consistency doctrine therefore fixate on this aspect of modern animal 
protection discourse to establish links to pro-fetal life arguments.24 Francione 
advances the view that, while sentience is morally significant, it cannot be 
determinative of the relationship between pro-animal arguments and the abortion 
issue.   
                                                                                                                                         
19 Gary Francione, “Abortion and Animal Rights: Are They Comparable Issues?” in Carol J Adams & 
Josephine Donovan, eds, Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1995) 149 [Francione]. 
20 See, e.g., Mensch & Freeman, supra note 16; Jeff McMahan, "Infanticide and Moral Consistency” (2013) 
39:5 J Medical Ethics 273. 
21 Francione, supra note 19 at 149. 
22 Ibid at 154. 
23 Ibid at 153. 
24 Abbate, supra note 17 at 147. 
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To begin with, the significance of sentience in animal rights theory—along 
with its fundamental definition—varies from scholar to scholar. Francione notes 
that “rights advocates do not regard sentience as playing the same theoretical 
role.”25 The Bentham/Singer utilitarian position turns largely on the weight 
afforded to sentience, but for philosopher Tom Regan, for example, it is simply 
the starting point in establishing moral consideration. Regan’s theory further 
requires that a being “must have a psychological status sufficiently complex so 
that we may say that the being has preferences, fears, hopes, mood changes, 
etc.”26 As a result, sentience cannot be invoked to draw connections between 
antiabortion arguments and animal protection theory generally.   
Moreover, Francione argues that if the utilitarian position is taken to be 
representative of all pro-animal arguments, human fetuses in the first trimester 
are nevertheless unlikely to be included in this calculus. Fetuses at later stages of 
development have displayed signs of sentience; however, the majority of 
nontherapeutic abortions are performed in the first trimester, during which 
period “there is substantial evidence that there is little, if any, sentience.”27 Even 
if sentience were proved in first-trimester fetuses, it would be very difficult to 
analogize to feelings experienced by a human or another animal. In any event, for 
Francione, this complicated line-drawing exercise is irrelevant; abortion and 
animal rights can—and should—be meaningfully distinguished on grounds other 
than sentience.28  
 
Despite its potential significance, other factors exist which are equally or 
more important than sentience—namely, the divergent political contexts of 
abortion and animal protection. The work of Singer and Regan can offer guidance 
when one is “confronted with a conflict between two separate and independent 
entities,” but the abortion problem represents a conflict between a woman and a 
                                                                                                                                         
25 Francione, supra note 19 at 153. 
26 Ibid at 153. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid at 150. 
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being who depends upon and resides within her body.29 In other words, abortion 
is a distinct moral issue.   
The state’s role in each scenario informs the distinction between the two 
issues. With respect to animal protection, the state can regulate, for example, 
vivisection without impinging on the vivisector’s bodily autonomy but, naturally, 
the same cannot be said for state regulation of abortion.30 Similarly, the 
government’s regulation of vivisection, which Francione argues would be more 
accurately likened to a scenario of child abuse than to abortion, does not violate 
vivisectors’ basic privacy rights. Quite the opposite, Parliament cannot regulate 
abortion “in the absence of a patriarchal intrusion of the law into a woman’s 
body,” an encroachment on bodily autonomy not generally accepted anywhere 
else in the law.31   
An accurate representation of the abortion scenario requires recognition of 
the pregnant woman’s unique role. In practical terms, the subject of this ‘debate’ 
is happening within her own body; she is, therefore, the only person in a position 
to make important decisions about the situation. Francione explains that 
utilitarian or deontological theories cannot be employed to obscure the fact that 
the abortion question represents a conflict between a woman and a fetus, the 
resolution of which presents only two possible alternatives. As he puts it, “one of 
the two parties involved in the conflict may make the decision, and since it is 
difficult for fetuses to make decisions, the woman is the only other available 
decision maker.”32 Otherwise the decision would fall to the state.33   
Allowing the state to decide the permissibility of abortions is an unjustifiable 
interference with the pregnant woman’s decisional and bodily autonomy. As such, 
it is futile to analyze the sentience of fetuses at different times during the 
pregnancy and delineate a threshold for moral consideration. The evaluation of 
fetal moral rights in isolation from the pregnant woman is inherently incomplete. 
                                                                                                                                         
29 Ibid at 154. 
30 Ibid at 150. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at 156. 
33 Ibid. 
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Such an analysis is prejudicial toward a careful examination of the ethical 
parameters of reproductive choice.   
 
Cheryl Abbate, together with other critics, has called for animal advocates 
to extend their animal protection ethic to recognize fetuses’ inherent worth. This 
demand for so-called moral consistency is based on the idea that the animating 
principles surrounding animal rights require a parallel approach to the abortion 
question and that it is inconsistent to apply them selectively.34 Her reading of 
animal rights theory culminates in the assertion that sentience is the “vital 
characteristic” that gives rise to moral subjecthood.35 Abbate begins by assigning 
sentience to at least some fetuses and then deviates from the plain meaning of 
the word; she imports the ability to prefer and desire, which artificially expands 
the scope of fetal interests. Under this definition, a sentient being has “equal 
moral worth”; this subject is entitled to full, non-discriminatory consideration of 
its interests. Or, in this context, the fetus has interests of equal ethical concern to 
those of the pregnant woman.36    
Abbate ostensibly aims her arguments directly at Francione’s 1995 article, 
but she still chooses to focus almost exclusively on sentience, and she positions 
Francione’s work as though it, too, turns on this concept. Her misunderstanding 
may be the result of genuine confusion, but it is more likely a matter of 
convenience; focusing on the sentience of the fetus allows it to become the centre 
of the analysis, which in turn requires that the woman’s interests are only a 
secondary consideration.  
 
Abbate’s abortion analysis exaggerates the significance of sentience, distorts 
crucial elements of Francione’s treatise, and omits discussion of other, more 
important factors. Her analysis is therefore instructive for an understanding of 
                                                                                                                                         
34 Abbate, supra note 17 at 145. 
35 Ibid at 147. 
36 Ibid at 149. 
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how pro-animal arguments can be distorted and exploited toward a false assertion 
against women’s choice. First, she identifies sentience as the crux of Francione’s 
thesis; she claims that his philosophy designates sentience as the threshold 
criterion for “membership into the moral community” as well as rightholder 
status.37 Then, based on this foundational assumption, Abbate summarizes her 
perception of Francione’s animal rights position in a two-step process:   
1. If a being is sentient, then it is the bearer of prima facie rights, 
including the prima facie right to life. 
 2. Certain animals are sentient. Therefore, certain animals are bearers 
of rights, including the prima facie right to life.38   
She proceeds to apply a moral consistency argument to the abortion issue:  
Yet, if a sentience based animal rights theory is to remain morally 
consistent, it is committed to using the same line of reasoning in order 
to grant the right to life to sentient fetuses. Thus, Francione’s theory is 
committed to the following argument: … certain (sentient) fetuses are 
bearers of rights, including the prima facie right to life.39   
While Abbate may be drawing on Francione’s actual scholarship with respect to 
animal rights and sentience, her rebuttal does little to address the thrust of 
Francione’s arguments: that sentience is all but irrelevant when the being in 
question resides within another person’s body. 
 
Abbate finds further common ground between pro-fetal life and –animal 
ethics in the dependence on humans shared by fetuses and certain animals. She 
posits that comparable instances of dependence arise when a woman carries a 
pregnancy past eight weeks and when humans create or cause animals to rely on 
them for protection and care. Considering these analogous relationships under 
an animal protection framework—and ignoring the literal objectification of the 
woman’s body that this presents—Abbate suggests that “a woman is morally 
                                                                                                                                         
37 Ibid at 149. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid at 150. 
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responsible for assisting a sentient fetus when her voluntary acts or omissions 
cause the fetus to be dependent and vulnerable.”40   
In keeping with this line of reasoning, once a pregnancy has passed the eight-
week mark, it follows that the woman ought to have known that she is pregnant. 
At this stage, the woman and the fetus have formed a “morally significant 
relationship” and the woman should not be permitted to abort.41 Further, Abbate 
argues that a woman’s “voluntary omission” to abort before this stage in fetal 
development grants the fetus “a special right … to use the woman’s body.”42 The 
foregoing argument is in effect saying that, once this critical juncture in pregnancy 
is reached, the rights of an eight-week-old fetus automatically trump those of the 
pregnant woman.   
 
Although Abbate’s allowance for abortions during the first eight weeks of 
pregnancy may seem generous to some supporters of fetal rights, her analysis fails 
nonetheless to give the pregnant woman due consideration. To be persuasive, 
arguments in support of the homological perspective require the removal of the 
woman’s competing interest in bodily autonomy. That is, the conflation of pro-
fetal and –animal rights positions is only possible by willfully ignoring the 
importance of the pregnant woman, biologically and otherwise, to fetal 
development.    
Parsing the contours of Abbate’s argument is useful only to a point. The 
main thrust of her paper rests on the artificial inflation of the role of sentience. 
As an isolated incident, this article is a fairly commonplace example of reductive 
argumentation. The more important inquiry asks about the pervasiveness of this 
discourse. The conflation of this unlikely pair is not the product of random 
choice; instead, the impulse to categorize the rights of women and nonhuman 
                                                                                                                                         
40Ibid at 146. 
41 Ibid at 161. 
42 Ibid. 
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animals together is symptomatic of the patriarchal oppression that conceives of 
the other as uniformly subordinate.   
The oppressive impulse that underlies the subordination of women, among 
other marginalized groups, applies equally to nonhuman animals. Indeed, the 
predominant conception of nonhuman animals is an extension of the same 
patriarchal ideology that has been and continues to be used to oppress women.43 
Kao describes this as the “logic of domination.”44 This social construction allows 
the marginalization of women and nonhuman animals to be mutually informing 
and reinforcing. Kao notes the parallel rhetoric that feminizes nature and 
dehumanizes women toward a uniform otherness. This “cultural-symbolic 
association” reinforces the patriarchy as the exhaustive sphere of dominance.45   
Against the norm of the rational actor under patriarchy—male, and as a 
result, independent, reasonable, stoic, and in control of the natural world—
women and nonhuman animals are pigeonholed in the same category of inferior 
other.46 While it is by no means the exclusive source of patriarchal authority, the 
law has a specific and significant role in embedding dominant attitudes such as 
these into our social fabric.   
 
At the outset of this inquiry, it is useful to note the hostility that characterizes 
the law’s relation to those at the margins. In his discussion of the opposition to 
proposed changes to current anti-cruelty legislation, John Sorenson observes the 
majoritarian distrust of animal welfare advocates. One Member of Parliament, 
David Anderson, is particularly vocal on the subject, and his relevant comment is 
worth reproducing at length:   
We are in a situation now where animals will have more protection 
than human beings. In particular I am thinking of fetuses in their 
mother’s [sic] wombs. Research has consistently shown that fetuses 
                                                                                                                                         
43 Sheri Ann Lucas, Should Feminists Be Vegetarians? A Feminist Defense of Ethical Vegetarianism (Kingston: 
University Microfilms International, 2002) at 25 [Lucas]. 
44 Supra note 14 at 17. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Lucas, supra note 43. 
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react to pain and that they pull away from it. There are a number of 
videos that have been made showing the impact of them being torn 
away from the womb and being destroyed … We are walking into a 
situation where the government is willing to protect animal life at a 
level that it certainly is not extending for human beings. What are we 
coming to? We have some strange things happening in our country.47   
This unprompted shift from animal protection to antiabortion rhetoric betrays 
the function of this artificial relationship to those in positions of power. To 
conform with patriarchal logic, any improvements to the laws protecting 
nonhuman animals must happen together with the protection of fetuses. This is 
not to suggest an interest in concurrent improvement for these historically 
disadvantaged groups; rather, our related ideas of pregnant women and 
nonhuman animals exemplify the unified impulse to dominate those outside the 
centre of power. By failing to engage with the differences that exist within these 
groups, the law is able to homogenize and ignore perspectives at the margins.   
 
As Sorenson observes, “law is not the justice-based regulation of power but 
a mask to conceal its workings.”48 It is therefore important to understand legal 
discourse as both an instrument and reflection of power. Accordingly, when 
considering the courts and other institutions of authority, a useful preliminary 
inquiry asks: who gets to speak?49 Once the locus of authority is established, this 
asymmetrical power relationship necessarily combines and homogenizes all 
others outside the centre of power. As a result, the second inquiry—in other 
words, who is spoken for? —reveals itself to be a far-reaching category that 
crosses the boundaries of species. In this way, the ecofeminist preoccupation with 
the intersections of oppression provides a useful tool for revealing the law’s 
treatment of the other.   
Marti Kheel helpfully summarizes the ecofeminist position: “Just as men, 
under patriarchal society, view women as their antithesis in the quest for 
                                                                                                                                         
47 John Sorenson, “‘Some Strange Things Happening in our Country’: Opposing Proposed Changes in Anti-
Cruelty Laws in Canada” (2003) 12 Soc & Leg Stud 377 at 387. 
48 Ibid at 378. 
49 Ibid at 381. 
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masculine self-identity, so too humans have often viewed animals as a foil for the 
establishment of human identity.”50 Rather than degrade the status of women, 
then, the juxtaposition of animals and women helps bring into relief the relations 
of power that transcend gender and species.51 This comparison and the lens of 
ecofeminism provide a meaningful rendering of the margins of society.   
The critics who continue to conflate pro-animal and –fetal rights positions 
are informed, at least in part, by a legal framework that marginalizes the other in 
a consistent and generalized way. While they are in no way exhaustive, three 
central concerns of ecofeminist thought elucidate some recurring motifs in the 
law’s paternal relation with both women and nonhuman animals: displacement of 
agency, fragmentation of the self, and instrumental objectification. In the 
following analysis, I consider these three themes in relation to R v Morgentaler52 
and R v Ménard,53 two of the leading judgments on their respective subject matters. 
These decisions shed light on the law’s systematic backgrounding, devaluation, 
and instrumentalization of the other that affect nonhuman animals and women 
in parallel ways.54   
 
An understanding of the Court’s decision in Morgentaler necessitates a careful 
reading of the relevant Criminal Code provision, which is no longer of any force 
or effect. Section 251 [now section 287] provides that   
(1) Every one who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a female 
person, whether or not she is pregnant, uses any means for the purpose 
                                                                                                                                         
50 Marti Kheel, Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008) 
at 172. 
51 Richard Twine, “Intersectional disgust? Animals and (eco)feminism” (2010) 20:3 Feminism & Psychology 
397 at 400 [Twine]. 
52 Morgentaler, supra note 1. 
53 Ménard, supra note 2. 
54 Val Plumwood, “Conversations with Gaia” in Alison M Jaggar, ed, Living With Contradictions: Controversies in 
Feminist Social Ethics (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994) 666 at 667. 
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of carrying out his intention is guilty of an indictable offence and is 
liable to imprisonment for life.  
(2) Every female person who, being pregnant, with intent to procure 
her own miscarriage, uses any means or permits any means to be used 
for the purpose of carrying out her intention is guilty of an indictable 
offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.55  
The fact that a third-party provider was subject to such pronounced 
consequences, in contrast to the pregnant woman, is arguably symptomatic of the 
law’s modest appraisal of female agency. Whether a woman chose an abortion 
and allowed it to be procured by a physician or endeavoured to effect it herself, 
her culpability appears virtually identical. This may have been relevant if this 
provision was ever evaluated in light of decisional autonomy, but the most 
important part of section 251 this analysis reads:  
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to  
(a) a qualified medical practitioner, other than a member of a 
therapeutic abortion committee for any hospital, who in good 
faith uses in an accredited or approved hospital any means 
for the purpose of carrying out his intention to procure the 
miscarriage of a female person, or 
(b) a female person who, being pregnant, permits a qualified 
medical practitioner to use in an accredited or approved 
hospital any means for the purpose of carrying out her 
intention to procure her own miscarriage, if, before the use 
of those means, the therapeutic abortion committee for that 
accredited or approved hospital, by a majority of the 
members of the committee and at a meeting of the committee 
at which the case of the female person has been reviewed, 
(c) has by certificate in writing stated that in its opinion the 
continuation of the pregnancy of the female person would or 
would be likely to endanger her life or health, and  
(d) has caused a copy of that certificate to be given to the 
qualified medical practitioner.56  
                                                                                                                                         
55 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 287(1) & (2). 
56 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 287(4). 
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These exemptions provided an onerous and ill-defined threshold for a pregnant 
woman to meet if she wished to terminate the pregnancy and stay within the 
bounds of the law. This section had both the intent and effect of limiting access 
to reproductive healthcare, and formed the basis of the majority opinion in 
Morgentaler.  
 
R v Morgentaler is a Supreme Court of Canada decision from 1988. The case 
concerned the constitutionality of section 251 of the Criminal Code, which forced 
pregnant women seeking abortions to be approved by accredited hospitals’ 
“Therapeutic Abortion Committees.” Dr Henry Morgentaler, together with two 
other physicians, established a non-accredited abortion clinic. Their aim was to 
increase access to abortion for women who had not received official approval, 
and to promote women’s right to reproductive freedom. The appellants raised a 
number of different grounds of appeal, but section 7 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms quickly emerged as the central issue.57   
The Court ruled 5 to 2 that the offence could not be saved under section 1 
of the Charter. However, the majority was split 2-2-1 on which part of section 7 
was engaged, and only Wilson J, the Court’s lone female voice at the time, invokes 
the right to liberty under section 7 of the Charter. While ostensibly a positive 
outcome, the Court’s decision in Morgentaler represents a failure to meaningfully 
interact with the gendered component of the abortion issue, and it ultimately does 
little to support women’s decisional autonomy in matters respecting their own 
bodies.   
 
Notwithstanding the positive result in Morgentaler, critics were dismayed to 
find that the decision still authorizes the displacement of a woman’s agency to a 
third-party group—a committee of doctors who are, statistically speaking, likely 
                                                                                                                                         
57 Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 31. 
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to be predominantly male.58 The judgment of Dickson CJC privileges fetal 
interests over those of the pregnant woman, and his reasons for striking down 
section 251 turn solely on the undue delays it brought about:  
State protection of foetal interests may well be deserving of 
constitutional recognition under s. 1. Still, there can be no escape from 
the fact that Parliament has failed to establish either a standard or a 
procedure whereby any such interests might prevail over those of the 
woman in a fair and non-arbitrary fashion.59  
The Court, with the exception of Wilson J, sidesteps any consideration of the 
effects the impugned process would have on a woman’s ability to make important 
decisions about her own life.   
Morgentaler, while certainly not the only instance of jurisprudential misogyny, 
is an instructive example of the subtle ways in which the law fails to recognize 
women as “competent moral actors.”60 By acknowledging that the underlying 
purpose of section 251 may be saved if Parliament reconfigures the process 
involved, Dickson CJC implicitly accepts that a woman may not be capable of 
making a morally sound decision on her own. Carol Adams maintains, “women, 
despite the overwhelming misogyny of moral theory that has posited them as 
unable to make moral decisions, can and do make moral decisions quite 
capably.”61 Still, inasmuch as it is legally permissible to reassign a woman’s 
decisional rights to a person in authority, she can never truly have autonomy over 
her own body.  
 
Even the majority reasons in the Morgentaler decision betray a profound 
disregard for the connection between the pregnant woman and the fetus; as a 
subject, she is fragmented into pieces that do not reflect the reality of her 
                                                                                                                                         
58 In 1995, nearly 75% of the physicians practicing in Canada were male. See Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, Supply, Distribution and Migration of Canadian Physicians, 1999 (Ottawa: Southam Medical 
Database, 2000) at 12. 
59 Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 76. 




experience. Beetz J, perhaps for analytical clarity, explicitly divides the 
hypothetical pregnant woman into the fetus, as an individual, and the female body 
in which it is growing. He goes so far as to say that the “protection of the life and 
health of the pregnant woman is an ancillary objective.”62 Likewise, Dickson CJC 
describes the protection of fetal interests as “a valid government objective” to be 
balanced with the interests of women in their lives and health.63 This approach 
illustrates what Barbara Ehrenreich describes as “the misleading way we are told 
to visualize the fetus: as a sort of larval angel, suspended against a neutral 
background.”64   
Conceptualizing the rights of the woman and the fetus as anything less than 
inextricably linked not only undermines the pregnant woman’s bodily autonomy, 
but perpetuates a false notion of woman and fetus as analytically separable.65 
Consequently, it is misleading to discuss the issue of abortion as though the 
development of the fetus can occur independently of the woman’s biological 
support.66 When the law positions the woman and the fetus as in conflict, the 
actual subject affected by the impugned law in Morgentaler, the pregnant woman, 
is divided into imaginary sections; there is no “hard-and-fast boundary” there, 
and this process only serves to facilitate her objectification.67  
 
The majority in Morgentaler agrees that the impugned offence trespassed on 
women’s section 7 rights, but the justices penning majority reasons divided on 
exactly which of the enumerated rights was violated; only Wilson J would dispose 
of the case under the right to liberty, while the others opt to focus exclusively on 
security of the person. The male justices’ arguments may seem strange, but their 
reasoning is as clear as it is alarming: state intervention is sometimes necessary to 
                                                                                                                                         
62 Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 82. 
63 Kerri A Froc, “The Past, Present and Future of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: 
Marking the 25th Anniversary of Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486” (2011) 42 Ottawa L Rev 
411 at para 13. 
64 Adams, supra note 60 at 58. 
65 Diana Majury, “The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebration” (2002) 40:3 
Osgoode Hall LJ 297 at 319 [Majury]. 
66 Adams, supra note 60 at 58. 
67 Ariel Salleh, Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx, and the Postmodern (New York: St Martins Press, 1997) at 39. 
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prevent a woman from ‘selfishly’ terminating a pregnancy.68 They have 
determined that, absent medical risk or another unjustifiable physical harm, a 
pregnant woman ought to proceed with a pregnancy, in accordance with fetal—
and societal—interests.   
Wilson J’s decision is not only unique in its treatment of the relevant law, 
but also in the language she uses; while the others assign the woman a passive 
role in the abortion context— “perform abortions upon women,”69 “protected from 
interference by others,” etc.—she sees the hypothetical woman as the most 
important actor, the main character, a whole person.70 Wilson J’s reasons may 
also shed some light on the operative logic in her male counterparts’ judgments. 
She refutes the notion that this is a purely practical and medical decision; rather, 
the pregnant woman’s decision is informed by her self-perception and perceived 
relationship to society as a whole. In arguably one of the strongest instances of 
jurisprudential feminism, Wilson J writes: 
 It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to 
such a dilemma, not just because it is outside the realm of his personal 
experience (although this is of course the case) but because he can 
relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective 
elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma.71   
By overlooking the more apposite right to liberty in favour of security of the 
person, Dickson CJC and Beetz J reinforce the idea that women should 
sometimes be compelled to sustain pregnancies they do not want. They isolate 
her reproductive capacity from her lived experience and, in doing so, they 
ontologize women as “usable.”72   
Where Wilson J locates a Charter violation in the “female psyche,” the 
majority further objectifies the pregnant woman by excluding the sphere of 
reason or decisional autonomy from her section 7 protection. For Dickson CJC, 
the infringement is exclusively a “physical” and “emotional” interference with her 
                                                                                                                                         
68 Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 74. 
69 Ibid at 31 [emphasis mine]. 
70 Ibid at 53 [emphasis mine]. 
71 Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 171. 
72 Adams, supra note 60 at 69. 
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bodily integrity,73 implicitly invoking the historical perception of women in 
contrast with the ‘reasonable man.’ The separation of physical or psychological 
processes from the more abstract concepts of liberty or decisional autonomy 
requires a reductive, objectifying analysis. As Kaposy and Downie observe, this 
reasoning embodies a “harm-based rather than a choice-based analysis.”74 The 
counterintuitive choice, then, to focus on the right to security of the person in 
the context of the abortion debate becomes inevitable under the majority 
rendering of women as physical and emotional—but never thinking or aspiring—
holders of rights.   
 
Just as the Morgentaler decision turned on the Code provision criminalizing 
abortion, the jurisprudence on animal welfare is largely framed in relation to the 
criminal prohibition on inflicting unnecessary suffering. It is therefore important 
to examine the provision that criminalizes this behaviour before considering how 
its interpretation demonstrates the tropes of oppression discussed above, albeit 
in a different context. Section 402(1)(a) [now section 445.1(1)(a)] provides that  
(1) Every one commits an offence who  
(a) wilfully causes or, being the owner, wilfully permits to be 
caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an animal or 
bird.75   
Much, then, turns on the judicial interpretation of “unnecessary.”76 Necessity 
connotes different meanings depending on the legal context, but perhaps never 
strays so far from its plain meaning as it does in the context of nonhuman animals. 
As the following decision demonstrates, the judges approach the necessity of 
suffering from a decidedly anthropocentric perspective.   
                                                                                                                                         
73 Morgentaler, supra note 1 at 57. 
74 Chris Kaposy & Jocelyn Downie, “Judicial Reasoning About Pregnancy and Choice” (2008) 16 Health LJ 
281 at para 20. 
75 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 445.1(1)(a). 
76 The text also clearly mandates willfulness as an element of the offence; however, this additional prerequisite 
is outside the scope of this discussion. 
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R v Ménard is a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal from 1978.77 The 
case concerned the interpretation of “necessity” as it related to animals’ pain and 
suffering under section 402(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The accused ran a business 
where he killed stray and unclaimed animals through the administration of carbon 
monoxide, and the question to be decided was whether his system caused more 
pain and suffering than was necessary.   
Justice Lamer, then sitting on the Court of Appeal, wrote the majority 
judgment of what remains a leading case on anti-cruelty offences.78 Much like in 
Morgentaler, the result in Ménard is positive overall, but the rationale animating the 
decision is less progressive than supporters of animal rights may have hoped. 
Lamer J describes a hierarchy in which nonhuman animals are naturally inferior 
to ‘man,’ and thus, responsibility for their wellbeing extends only so far as it is 
still “in the interests of man.”79 Ultimately, the promising outcome of Ménard is 
not enough to overcome the deeply problematic line of reasoning that led there.  
 
Examples of the displacement of nonhuman animals’ agency and bodily 
autonomy to human decision-makers can be found everywhere. Ménard, while 
encouraging in result, is no different. According to Ménard, it is for Parliament to 
decide what degree of pain can and should be tolerated by nonhuman animals. 
Lamer J holds that the plain meaning of cruelty has no place in the relevant 
Criminal Code provision; that is, inflicting pain— “even if extreme pain”—is 
insufficient to satisfy the elements of the offence.80 Ultimately, conviction turns 
on whether the pain is necessary to achieve human ends. Even if the animal is 
demonstrating signs of distress or intense pain, this, in itself, is not an indicator 
that the treatment is excessive or that it should not be accepted. The experience 
                                                                                                                                         
77 While this is obviously not the most recent decision regarding cruelty to animals, Ménard remains, as Lesli 
Bisgould observes, the classical statement of the “old hierarchy” separating the human and nonhuman 
(Lesli Bisgould, Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 64). 
78 Maneesha Deckha, “Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law and Animal 
Vulnerability Under a Property Paradigm” (2013) 50:4 Alta L Rev 783 at para 58. 
79 Ménard, supra note 2 at para 46. 
80 Ibid. 
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of nonhuman animals has little, if anything, to do with how the law conceptualizes 
their comfort and wellbeing.   
Here, the perceived importance of the activity in question dictates what is 
undue pain and suffering for nonhumans. It goes without saying that this is a 
human standard, which is defined and implemented by humans based entirely on 
human experience. Maneesha Deckha writes, “the legislation at issue in Ménard 
… subordinate[s] animal interests to those of legal persons and calibrate[s] 
“unnecessary suffering” … according to cultural norms and relevant industry 
standards about acceptable animal use.”81 Although the case appears initially to 
forbid nonhuman animals’ suffering, in result it relies entirely on the judgment of 
humans as to where to draw the line for ‘unnecessary suffering.’ 
 
Just as the definition of a nonhuman animal’s pain and suffering is informed 
by human ends, so, too, is its identity. The animal subject is defined in relation to 
the type of human use to which it is subject; in other words, the same species of 
animal may be conceptualized differently depending on the human activity at 
issue. Consider, for example, a rabbit: her character changes radically in the eyes 
of the law when she is framed as a tool for experimentation as opposed to a 
beloved household pet.   
The law’s fragmentation of the animal subject is clearly illustrated in the 
following passage from Lamer J’s judgment: “It is sometimes necessary to make 
an animal suffer for its own good or again to save a human life.”82 He invokes 
examples such as experimentation or vivisection for human benefit, practices 
which of course cause suffering but do not engage criminal liability. While an 
animal left without food or water for several days, to use Lamer J’s example, may 
suffer less than the subjects of vivisection, this provision condemns only the 
former because of the perceived utility of the activities in question. Accordingly, 
when the courts are faced with the question of the animal subject—that is, what 
is an animal? —it is answered simply by determining how it is being used. Lesli 
                                                                                                                                         
81 Supra note 78 at para 58. 
82 Ménard, supra note 2 at para 47. 
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Bisgould writes, “it is the person’s interest to be protected, whether instrumental 
or emotional. Even [with pets], animals matter because and to the extent that they 
matter to us.”83   
 
The broad exceptions to the Code provision carved out in Ménard, and the 
law’s treatment of nonhuman animals more generally, requires objectification to 
the point of obscuration. Consider, for example, the “inevitably very painful” 
experiments endorsed in this judgment: to conceive of test subjects as anything 
other than unfeeling objects raises an ethical dilemma that is virtually absent in 
our jurisprudence.84 Thus, Ménard is particularly instructive for what it says about 
the apparent judicial notice of the legitimacy of anthropocentrism.   
The result, as Andrew Brighten puts it, mandates that, “where a method 
exists that is reasonably accessible and not cost-prohibitive, and that reduces 
suffering to the minimum inevitable level, it will be criminal not to adopt that 
method.”85 Significantly, this thesis has become a starting point for legal 
considerations of nonhuman suffering, sometimes referred to as the “Ménard 
analysis.”86 Therefore, while subsequent jurisprudence proceeds with the 
assumption that some suffering is acceptable, the foundational nature of Ménard 
necessitates some basis for this conclusion. In perhaps the most famous portion 
of the judgment, Lamer J finds this basis in his reading of the great chain of being. 
He explains: 
[w]ithin the hierarchy of our planet the animal occupies a place which, 
if it does not give rights to the animal, at least prompts us, being 
animals who claim to be rational beings, to impose on ourselves 
behaviour which will reflect in our relations with them those virtues 
we seek to promote in our relations among humans. On the other 
hand, the animal is inferior to man and takes its place within a hierarchy 
which is the hierarchy of the animals, and above all is a part of nature 
with all its “racial and natural” selections. The animal is subordinate to 
                                                                                                                                         
83 Supra note 77 at 128. 
84 Ménard, supra note 2 at para 47. 
85 Andrew Brighten, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Welfare of Animal Persons: Dissolving the Bill C-10B 
Conflict” (2011) 10:1 Indigenous LJ 39 at 47. 
86 Ibid at 56. 
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nature and to man.87  While this description of the natural order may 
be offensive, it imposes coherence on the judgment; that is, the 
precedent it sets flows logically from the starting presumption that 
nonhuman animals are “subordinate to nature and to man.”  
Ultimately, Ménard exemplifies the alarming degree of objectification that is 
required to render our instrumental uses of nonhuman animals acceptable.   
 
As illustrated in the foregoing examples, the law’s treatment of abortion and 
animal protection consistently asks the wrong questions. These decisions forgo 
consideration of the individual animal or woman in exchange for generalized 
misogynistic and anthropocentric analysis. Her interests are supplanted by male 
and human perspectives, a process which perpetuates the marginalization of the 
woman and nonhuman animal as others. Adams aptly refers to animals and 
women in this context as “absent referents.”88 She explains that the abortion 
question can revolve around the fetus only when one strips away the context of 
pregnant women’s lives. Likewise, animals can easily be put to use for humans 
when one ignores the animal’s interest in life and comfort, among other things. 
She goes on to say that, “in both cases, … the social part of the context, that 
which experiences the consequences of decontextualizing— the pregnant woman 
and the living, breathing rabbit—disappear.”89   
Similarly, Susan Sherwin describes a process whereby pregnant women’s 
interests “are either ignored altogether or are viewed as deficient in some crucial 
respect and hence subject to coercion for the sake of their fetuses.”90 This 
approach is apparent in the law’s handling of both abortion and animal welfare: 
the subject as an individual is obscured and broken down such that her interests 
may easily be glossed over, if not explicitly overridden.   
                                                                                                                                         
87 Ménard, supra note 2 at para 49. 
88 Supra note 60 at 58. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Susan Sherwin, “Abortion Through a Feminist Ethics Lens” in Alison M Jaggar, ed, Living with Contradictions: 
Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994) 314 at 318. 
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As a whole, supporters of fetal rights are uninterested in advocating for 
animals. While this may not hold for every individual—some people may 
genuinely, if irrationally, believe that an ethic of caring that extends to living 
animals should also cover human fetuses, and vice versa—it is likely true of most 
of the antiabortionists invoking the discourse of animal protection to bolster their 
arguments.91 The simplistic conflation of fetal and animal rights cannot withstand 
scrutiny, despite its initial appeal. When it is deployed, it is rarely meant to be a 
tool to generate interest in animal welfare; rather, pro-animal arguments are 
misappropriated and misapplied in order to conceal the very central role of the 
woman in the abortion debate.  
 
Generally, antiabortionists believe that the abortion question turns on the 
moral status of the fetus, and, once they eschew the interests of the pregnant 
woman, they ground their analysis in an “all or nothing” approach. As Sherwin 
notes, “[o]pponents of abortion have structured the debate so that it is necessary 
to define the status of the fetus as either valued the same as other humans (and 
hence entitled not to be killed) or as lacking in all value.”92 It has long been 
established that, with respect to nonhuman animals, the demarcation of a clear 
threshold for moral status is virtually impossible;93 even among animal advocates 
there is no consensus. The application, then, of an antiabortionist’s absolute 
stance on moral status to the question of animal rights would require that they 
also categorically oppose the killing of any nonhuman animal. Curiously, chants 
                                                                                                                                         
91 The most extreme example is found in the implicit link drawn by George Dunea in his brief parallel 
discussions of abortion and the animal welfare movement, where he refers to animal rights as a “radical 
fringe” (“Abortion and Animal Rights” (1990) 300:6731 British Medical J 1068 at 1068). More generally, 
there is a significant body of overtly partisan antiabortion literature that invokes animal rights only to 
bolster their arguments. For example, Matt Walsh suggests that only antiabortionists can legitimately 
express anger when puppies are needlessly slaughtered before referring to them as “dead mutt[s]” (“‘Pro-
Choicers’: Here’s Why You Cannot Support Abortion While Opposing Puppy Murder” (11 February 
2014), Matt Walsh (blog), online: <www.themattwalshblog.com/2014/02/11/>. 
92 Supra note 90 at 317. 
93 Angus Taylor, “Philosophy and the Case for Animals” in Vaughan Black, Peter Sankoff & Katie Sykes, eds, 
Canadian Perspectives on Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) 11 at 13. 
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promoting vegetarianism do not feature very prominently in demonstrations 
outside of abortion clinics.   
A fundamental difference in the approach taken by animal advocates is in 
their characterization of the human species. As Adams points out, 
“[a]ntiabortionists absolutize each individual fetus” in support of the “glaringly 
anthropocentric” presumption that every fetus should be born, while supporters 
of animal welfare relativize the human species within nature.94 As a direct result, 
animal defense also relativizes the importance of the human fetus; it is considered 
in context rather than in isolation, taking into account the social and 
environmental consequences its birth will have.95 Antiabortionists are not simply 
uninterested in animal advocacy; they are wary of it and actively threatened by it. 
Given insurmountable inconsistencies, likening the two positions requires the 
misapplication of at least one.  
 
Dualistic reasoning animates the all or nothing proposition embodied in the 
pro-fetal life conception of moral personhood. More specifically, the arguments 
advanced by Abbate create a false dichotomy, where each side is defined in 
relation to the other. Under the antiabortion rubric, a fetus is alive and therefore 
worthy of protection, in contrast to what is not alive or deserving of ethical 
consideration. In his discussion of abortion, Singer explains this argument in 
formal terms:   
First premise: It is wrong to kill an innocent human being.  
Second premise: A human fetus is an innocent human being.  
Conclusion: It is wrong to kill a human fetus.96   
For the purposes of this discussion, the second premise is particularly important. 
The designation of “innocent human being” is clearly all or nothing, and the 
                                                                                                                                         
94 Supra note 60 at 64. 
95 Ibid at 65. 
96 Supra note 4 at 138. 
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implications are the same: if this criterion is met, life should be preserved, 
presumably at all costs.  
The simplicity of this argument breaks down when one considers the 
subtleties of reproduction. As Ariel Salleh points out, “[t]he placenta is not a hard-
and-fast boundary, so a mother’s relation to the seed is a continuing biological 
negotiation between self and other. The pleasure of suckling a child is a reciprocal 
process, the very opposite of the 1/0 fracture.”97 Similarly, in the context of 
animal rights, the discussion is necessarily more nuanced than the wholesale 
abolition of the exploitation of nonhumans.98 The pervasive ‘line-drawing’ 
approach to the socio-legal conceptualization of the fetus and the nonhuman 
animal leads to a form of reasoning that eschews the complexities that 
differentiate the animal protection and abortion contexts. Interestingly, this 
simplistic reasoning—or the ‘1/0 fracture’—rarely plays out favourably for 
nonhuman animals in the legal context.   
While fundamental differences separate abortion and animal protection, 
arguments conflating the two will continue to recur so long as the law 
conceptualizes them as uniformly other. This may also be important to 
repudiating the patriarchy; identifying intersections of oppression reveals the 
workings of patriarchal oppression. Adams asks: 
[G]iven that the majority of animal defenders are women, does this not 
in itself say something? Women understand what it means to be 
deprived of freedom based on biological differences. We know that 
Western culture has situated women on the boundary of what is fully 
human, thus women have a very good reason to examine what our 
                                                                                                                                         
97 Supra note 67 at 39. 
98 Naturally, there are differences of opinion within the animal welfare movement. Certainly, some do 
advocate for the wholesale abolition of animal exploitation. This is not, however, the view espoused by 
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humans and animals. Given the reliance of antiabortion arguments on their philosophies, the wholesale-
abolitionist perspective goes beyond the scope of this discussion. Moreover, as Francione remarks above, 
even the abolitionist arguments cannot lend themselves to pro-fetal life sentiment due to the distinct 
political context of the abortion issue (Supra note 18 at 150). 
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culture does to other animals, while being suspicious of its control of 
women.99   
As Twine explains, using an ecofeminist framework to examine the treatment of 
women and nonhuman animals together does not result in the dehumanization 
of women, but instead a more revealing look at the socio-legal conceptualization 
of both.100  This is not an exhaustive analysis; rather, it is a consideration of the 
broad similarities in the law’s treatment of women and nonhuman animals. As 
demonstrated in Morgentaler and Ménard, both groups are deprived of their agency, 
fragmented into ‘usable’ pieces and thus objectified. Despite the relatively positive 
outcomes of the foregoing cases, the reasoning justifying the results nonetheless 
perpetuates their marginalization. This, even more than if the cases had been 
decided unfavourably, suggests that an awareness of the uniform impulse to 
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